Information Signaling: A Counter-Intuitive Defense Against Password
  Cracking by Bai, Wenjie et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
9.
10
06
0v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
2 S
ep
 20
20
Information Signaling: A Counter-Intuitive Defense
Against Password Cracking
Wenjie Bai
Department of Computer Science
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN
bai104@purdue.edu
Jeremiah Blocki
Department of Computer Science
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN
jblocki@purdue.edu
Ben Harsha
Department of Computer Science
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN
bharsha@purdue.edu
Abstract
We introduce password strength information signaling as a novel, yet counter-intuitive, defense against password cracking
attacks. Recent breaches have exposed billions of user passwords to the dangerous threat of offline password cracking attacks. An
offline attacker can quickly check millions (or sometimes billions/trillions) of password guesses by comparing their hash value
with the stolen hash from a breached authentication server. The attacker is limited only by the resources he is willing to invest. Our
key idea is to have the authentication server store a (noisy) signal about the strength of each user password for an offline attacker
to find. Surprisingly, we show that the noise distribution for the signal can often be tuned so that a rational (profit-maximizing)
attacker will crack fewer passwords. The signaling scheme exploits the fact that password cracking is not a zero-sum game i.e.,
the attacker’s profit is given by the value of the cracked passwords minus the total guessing cost. Thus, a well-defined signaling
strategy will encourage the attacker to reduce his guessing costs by cracking fewer passwords. We give a (heuristic) algorithm
to compute the optimal signaling scheme for a defender. As a proof-of-concept, we evaluate our mechanism on several empirical
password datasets and show that it can reduce the total number of cracked passwords by ≈ 10% of all users.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, large scale data-breaches have exposed billions of user passwords to the dangerous threat of offline
password cracking. An offline attacker who has obtained the (salted) cryptographic hash (hu = H(saltu, pwu)) of a user u’s
password (pwu) can attempt to crack the password by comparing this hash value with the hashes of likely password guesses
i.e., by checking if h′u = H(saltu, pw
′) for each pw′. The attacker can check as many guesses as she wants offline — without
interacting with the authentication server. The only limit is the resources that the attacker is willing to invest in trying to crack
the password. A rational password cracker [1], [2] will keep trying to crack the password until marginal guessing costs exceed
the marginal reward.
Password hashing serves as a last line of defense against an offline password cracker. A good password hash function H
should be moderately expensive to compute so that it becomes prohibitively expensive to check millions or billions of password
guesses. However, we cannot make H too expensive to compute as the honest authentication server needs to evaluate H every
time a user authenticates. In this paper, we explore a highly counter-intuitive defense against rational attackers which does not
impact hashing costs: information signaling! In particular, we propose to have the authentication server store a (noisy) signal
sigu which is correlated with the strength of the user’s password.
Traditionally, an authentication server stores the tuple (u, saltu, hu) for each user u where saltu is a random salt value and
hu = H(saltu, pwu) is the salted hash. We propose to have the authentication server instead store the tuple (u, saltu, sigu, hu),
where the (noisy) signal sigu is sampled based on the strength of the user’s password pwu. The signal sigu is simply recorded
for an offline attacker to find if the authentication server is breached. In fact, the authentication server never even uses sigu
when the user u authenticates1. At first glance, it seems highly counter-intuitive that the signal sigu could help to protect
user’s against offline attackers. The attacker will only use the signal sigu if it is beneficial — at minimum the attacker could
always choose to ignore the signal.
To provide some intuition for why information signaling might be beneficial we observe that password cracking is not a
zero-sum game between the defender and the password cracker. The defender’s utility is inversely proportional to the fraction
of user passwords that are cracked. By contrast, the attacker’s utility is given by his reward, i.e., the value of all of the cracked
passwords, minus his guessing costs. Thus, it is possible that a signaling scheme could increase the utility of both the defender
and the attacker.
a) Example 1: Suppose that we add a signal sigu = 1 to indicate that user u’s password pwu is uncrackable (e.g., the
entropy of the password is over 60-bits) and we add the signal sigu = 0 otherwise. In this case, the attacker will simply
choose to ignore accounts with sigu = 1 to reduce his total guessing cost. However, the number of cracked user passwords
stays unchanged.
1If a user u attempts to login with password pw′ the authentication server will lookup saltu and hu and accept pw′ if and only if hu = H(saltu, pw′).
b) Example 2: Suppose that we modify the signaling scheme above so that even when the user’s password pwu is not
deemed to be uncrackable we still signal sigu = 1 with probability ǫ and sigu = 0 otherwise. If the user’s password is
uncrackable we always signal sigu = 1. Assuming that ǫ is not too large a rational attacker might still choose to ignore any
account with sigu = 1 i.e., the attacker’s expected reward will decrease slightly, but the attacker’s guessing costs will also be
reduced. In this example, the fraction of cracked user passwords is reduced by up to ǫ i.e., any lucky user u with sigu = 1
will not have their password cracked.
In this work, we explore the following questions: Can information signaling be used to protect passwords against rational
attackers? If so, how can we compute the optimal signaling strategy?
c) Contributions: We introduce information signaling as a novel, counter-intuitive, defense against rational password
attackers. We adapt a Stackelberg game-theoretic model of Blocki and Datta [1] to characterize the behavior of a rational
password adversary and to characterize the optimal signaling strategy for an authentication server (defender). We analyze
the performance of information signaling empirically using several large password datasets: RockYou, Yahoo! [3], [4], and
LinkedIn [5]. We analyze our mechanism both in the idealistic setting, where the defender has perfect knowledge of the user
password distribution P and value v of each cracked password, as well as in a more realistic setting where the defender only
is given approximations of P and v. In our experiments, we analyze the fraction xsig(v) (resp. xno−sig(v)) of passwords that
a rational attacker would crack if the authentication server uses (resp. does not use) information signaling. Even when the
defender is only given an approximation of P we find that the reduction in the number of cracked passwords can be substantial
e.g., xno−sig(v) − xsig(v) ≈ 10%. We also show that information signaling can be used to help deter online attacks when
CAPTCHAs are used for throttling.
An additional advantage of our information signaling method is that it is independent of the password hashing method
and requires no additional hashing work. Implementation involves some determination of which signal to attach to a certain
account, but beyond that, any future authentication attempts are handled exactly as they were before i.e. the signal information
is ignored.
II. RELATED WORK
The human tendency to pick weaker passwords has been well documented e.g., [3]. Convincing users to select stronger
passwords is a difficult task [6]–[11]. One line of research uses password strength meters to nudge users to select strong
passwords [12]–[14] though a common finding is that users were not persuaded to select a stronger password [13], [14].
Another approach is to require users to follow stringent guidelines when they create their password. However it has been
shown that these methods also suffer from usability issues [10], [15]–[17], and in some cases can even lead to users selecting
weaker passwords [7], [18].
Offline password cracking attacks have been around for decades [19]. There is a large body of research on password
cracking techniques. State of the art cracking methods employ methods like Probabilistic Context-Free Grammars [20]–[22],
Markov models [23]–[26], and neural networks [27]. Further work [28] has described methods of retrieving guessing numbers
from commonly used tools like Hashcat [29] and John the Ripper [30].
A good password hashing algorithm should be moderately expensive so that it is prohibitively expensive for an offline
attacker to check billions of password guesses. Password BCRYPT [31] or PBKDF2 [32] attempt to increase guessing this
by iterating the hash function some number of times. However, Blocki et al. [2] argued that hash iteration cannot adequately
deter an offline attacker due to the existence of sophisticated ASICs (e.g., Bitcoin miners) which can compute the underling
hash function trillions of times per second. Instead, they advocate for the use of Memory Hard Functions (MHF) for password
hashing.
MHFs at their core require some large amount of memory to compute in addition to longer computation times. Candidate
MHFs include include SCRYPT [33], Balloon hashing [34], and Argon2 [35] (the winner of the Password Hashing Competition
[36]). MHFs can be split into two distinct categories or modes of operation - data-independent MHFs (iMHFs) and data-
dependent MHFs(dMHFs) (along with the hybrid idMHF, which runs in both modes). dMHFs like SCRYPT are maximally
memory hard [37], although they have the issue of possible side-channel attacks. Closely related to the notion of memory
hardness is that of depth-robustness - a property of directed acyclic graphs (DAG). Alwen and Blocki showed that a depth
robust DAG is both necessary [38] and sufficient [39] to construct a data-independent memory-hard function. Recent work has
proposed candidate iMHF constructions that show resistance to currently-known attacks [40]. Harsha and Blocki introduced a
memory-hard KDF which accepts the input passwords as a stream so that the hashing algorithm can perform extra computation
while the user is typing the password [41].
Blocki and Datta [1] used a Stackelberg game to model the behavior of a rational (profit-motivated) attacker against a cost-
asymmetric secure hashing (CASH) scheme. However, the CASH mechanism is not easily integrated with modern memory-hard
functions. By contrast, information signaling does not require any changes to the password hashing algorithm.
Distributed hashing methods (e.g. [42]–[45]) offer a method to distribute storage and/or computation over multiple servers.
Thus, an attacker who only breaches one server would not be able to mount an offline attack. Juels and Rivest proposed
the inclusion of several false entries per user, with authentication attempts checked against an independent server to see if
the correct entry was selected [46]. These “Honeyword” passwords serve as an alarm that an offline cracking attack is being
attempted. Other methods of slowing down attackers include requiring some hard (for computers) problem to be solved after
several failed authentication attempts (e.g. by using a CAPTCHA) [47]–[49]. An orthogonal line of research aims to protect
users against online guessing attacks [50], [51].
A large body of research has focused on alternatives to text passwords. Alternatives have included one time passwords [52]–
[54], challenge-response constructions [55], [56], hardware tokens [57], [58], and biometrics [59]–[61]. While all of these
offer possible alternatives to traditional passwords it has been noted that none of these strategies outperforms passwords in
all areas [62]. Furthermore, it has been noted that despite the shortcomings of passwords they remain the dominant method
of authentication even today, and research should acknowledge this fact and seek to better understand traditional password
use [63].
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Password Representation
We use P to denote the set of all passwords that a user might select and we use P to denote a distribution over user selected
passwords i.e., a new user will select the password pw ∈ P with probability Prx∼P[x = pw] — we typically write Pr[pw] for
notational simplicity.
1) Password Datasets: Given a set of N users U = {u1, . . . , uN} the corresponding password dataset Du is given by the
multiset Du = {pwu1 , . . . , pwuN} where pwui denotes the password selected by user ui. Fixing a password dataset D we let
fi denote the number of users who selected the ith most popular password in the dataset. We note that that f1 ≥ f2 ≥ . . . and
that
∑
i fi = N gives the total number N of users in the original dataset.
2) Empirical Password Distribution: Viewing our dataset D as N independent samples from the (unknown) distribution P
we use fi/N as an empirical estimate of the probability of the ith most common password pwdi and Df = (f1, f2, . . .) as
the corresponding frequency list. PD will denote the corresponding empirical distribution i.e., Prx∼PD [x = pwi] = fi/N . We
remark that when fi ≫ 1 the empirical estimate will be close to the actual distribution i.e., Pr[pwi] ≈ fi/N , but when fi = 1
the empirical estimate 1/N will likely diverge from the true probability value. Because the distribution P is unknown we will
typically work with the empirical estimates fi/N . In our empirical analysis, we will use dotted lines to indicate uncertainty
i.e., regions where the analysis depends heavily on the empirical probability estimates for passwords with frequency 1.
3) Password Equivalence Class: It is often convenient to represent Df in compressed form Dec = {(f1, c1), . . . , (fn′ , cn′)}.
Here, the tuple (fi, ci) means that there are ci distinct passwords, each of which appear exactly fi times in D. We refer to each
tuple (fi, ci) as an equivalence class of passwords i.e., passwords with the same frequency belong to an equivalence class.
We can also use D′ec = {(p1, c1), . . . , (pn, cn)} as a compact summary of the empirical password distribution PD. Here,
pi =
fi
N
, p1 > p2 > · · · pn and
∑n′
i=1 pici = 1. We typically have n
′ ≪ N in empirical password datasets e.g., for the LinkedIn
dataset we have N ≥ 1.7× 108 while n′ = 3639. Thus, an algorithm whose running time scales with n′ is much faster than
an algorithm whose running time scales with N .
B. Password Strength
There are various ways of defining how strong a given password is (see Appendix C and D for more details). Typically,
password strength is a qualitative description of some quantity score which could be entropy, the number of guesses to crack
a password, cracking time, etc. Based on some predefined thresholds t0, . . . , td−1, we label pw with strength level i if the
quantitive measurement score(pw) meets criterion ti < score(pw) ≤ ti+1 for some i. We also use user-friendly names for
different strength levels like “weak, “medium or “strong. If score(pw) is derived from composition rules, we will call strength
under this definition composition strength. If score(pw) is a measure of guessability under some password cracking model, we
will refer password strength in this sense as pattern strength. Further, we put forward the concept of frequency strength, where
score(pw) is related to frequency rank of pw, specifically score(pw) is the cumulative probability when passwords are in
descending order of popularity. This provides a clean method of partitioning passwords into strength categories for signaling,
and because of this, we use the frequency strength method throughout this work.
C. Differential Privacy and Count Sketches
As part of our information signaling, we need a way for the authentication server to (estimate) the strength of each user’s
passwords. We propose to do this is with a (differentially private) Count-Sketch data-structure, which allows us to approximately
determine how many users have selected each particular password. As a side-benefit the authentication server could also use the
Count-Sketch data structure to identify/ban overly popular passwords [64] and to defend against online guessing attacks [50],
[51]. We first introduce the notion of differential privacy.
1) ǫ-Differential Privacy: ǫ-Differential Privacy [65] is a mechanism that provides strong information-theoretic privacy
guarantees for all individuals in a dataset. Formally, an algorithm A preserves ǫ-differential privacy iff for all datasets D and
D′ that differ by only one element and all subsets S of Range(A):
Pr [A(D) ∈ S] ≤ eǫ Pr [A(D′) ∈ S] .
In our context, we can think of D (resp. D′) as a password dataset which does (resp. does not) include our user u’s password
pwu and we can think of A as a randomized algorithm that outputs a noisy count-sketch algorithm. Intuitively, differential
privacy guarantees that an attacker cannot even tell if pwu was included when the count-sketch was generated. In particular,
(up to a small multiplicative factor eǫ) the attacker cannot tell the difference between A(D) and A(D′) the count-sketch we
sample when pwu was (resp. was not) included. Thus, whatever the attacker hopes to about u’s from A(D) the attacker could
have learned from A(D′).
D. Count-sketch
A count sketch over some domain E is a biased probabilistic data structure that stores some information about the frequency
of items seen in a stream of data — in our password context we will use the domain E = P . A count-sketch functions as a
table T with width ws columns and depth ds rows. Initially, T [i, j] = 0 for all i ≤ ws and j ≤ ds. Each row is associated
with a hash function Hi : P → [ws], with each of the hash functions used in the sketch being pairwise independent.
To insert an element pw ∈ P into the count sketch we update T [i,Hi(pw)] ← T [i,Hi(pw)] + 1 for each i ≤ ds
2. To
estimate the frequency of pw we would output f (T [1, Hds(pw)], . . . , T [ds, Hds(pw)]) for some function f : N
d → N. In our
experiments we instantiate f = min (Count-Min-Sketch) though other options are possible e.g., f = mean (Count-Mean) or
f = median (Count-Median) 3.
Oserve that adding a password only alters the value of T [i, j] at ds locations. Thus, to preserve ǫ-differential privacy we
can initialize each cell T [i, j] by adding Laplace noise with scaling parameter ds/ǫ [66].
E. Other Notation
Given a permutation π over P we let λ(π,B) :=
∑B
i=1 Pr [pw
π
i ] denote the probability that a randomly sampled password
pw ∈ P would be cracked by an attacker who checks the first B guesses according to the order π — here pwπi is the ith
password in the sequence π. Given an randomized algorithm A and a random string r we use y ← A(x; r) to denote the output
when we run A with input x fixing the outcome of the random coins to be r. We use y
$
← A(x) to denote a random sample
drawn by sampling the random coins r uniformly at random. Given a randomized (signaling) algorithm A : P → [0, d − 1]
we define the conditional probability Pr[pw | y] := Prx∼P,r[x = pw | y = A(pw)] and we define
λ(π,B; y) :=
B∑
i=1
Pr[pwπi | y] .
We remark that Pr[pw | y] can be evaluated using Bayes Law given knowledge of the signaling algorithm A(x).
IV. INFORMATION SIGNALING AND PASSWORD STORAGE
In this section, we overview our basic signaling mechanism deferring until later how to optimally tune the parameters of
the mechanism to minimize the number of cracked passwords.
A. Account Creation and Signaling
When users create their accounts they provide a user name u and password pwu. First, the server runs the canonical password
storage procedure—randomly selecting a salt value saltu and calculating the hash value hu = H(saltu, pwu). Next, the server
calculates the (estimated) strength stu ← getStrength(pwu) of password pwu and samples the signal sigu
$
← getSignal(stu).
Finally, the server stores the tuple (u, saltu, sigu, hu) — later if the user u attempts to login with a password pw
′ the
authentication server will accept pw′ if and only if hu = H(saltu, pw
′). The account creation process is formally presented
in Algorithm 1.
A traditional password hashing solution would simply store the tuple (u, saltu, hu) i.e., excluding the signal sigu. Our
mechanism requires two additionally subroutines getStrength(·) and getSignal(·) to generate this signal. The first algorithm
is deterministic. It takes the user’s password pwu as input and outputs stu — (an estimate of) the password strength. The
second randomized algorithm takes the (estimated) strength parameter stu and outputs a signal sigu. We use si,j to denote
the probability of observing the signal sigu = j given that the estimated strength level was stu = i. Thus, getSignal(·) can be
encoded using a signaling matrix S with S[i, j] = si,j .
2In some instantiations of count sketch we would instead set T [i,Hi(pw)]← T [i,Hi(pw)] +Gi(pw) where the hash function Gi : P → {−1, 1}
3Typically, when instantiating f with the median function one also subtracts the bias from the overall estimate
Algorithm 1 Signaling during Account Creation
Input: u, pwu, L, d
1: saltu
$
← {0, 1}L
2: hu ← H(saltu, pwu)
3: stu ← getStrength(pwu)
4: sigu
$
← getSignal(stu, d)
5: StoreRecord(u, saltu, sigu, hu)
We remark that for some signaling matrices (e.g., if S[·, 0] = 1 for all i 4) then the actual signal sigu is uncorrelated with
the password pwu. In this case our mechanism is equivalent to the traditional (salted) password storage mechanism where
getSignal(·) is replaced with a constant/null function. getStrength(·) is password strength oracle that outputs the actual/estimated
strength of a password. We discuss ways that getStrength(·) could be implemented in Section VIII. For now, we omit the
implementation details of strength oracle getStrength(·) for sake of readability.
B. Generating Signals
We use SL = [0, d − 1] (strength levels) to denote the range of getStrength(·). For example, if SL = {0, 1, 2} then 0
would correspond to weak passwords, 2 would correspond to strong passwords and 1 would correspond to medium strength
passwords. It will be convenient to assume that the range of our signaling algorithm getSignal(·) is also SL so that our
signaling matrix
S =


s0,0 s0,1 · · · s0,d−1
s1,0 s1,1 · · · s1,d−1
...
...
. . .
...
sd−1,0 sd−1,1 · · · sd−1,d−1

 ,
is a square matrix S ∈ Rd×d. However, it is not strictly required that S is a square matrix. The signaling process is formally
presented in Algorithm 2. Intuitively, for all i, j ∈ SL we have Pr[getSignal(i) = j] = S[i, j] = si,j .
Algorithm 2 Generating a Signal getSignal(·)
Input: stu, d
1: r
$
← (0, 1]
2: i← stu
3: si,0 ← 0
4: for j = 0 to d− 1 do
5: if
∑j
k=0 si,k < r ≤
∑j+1
k=0 si,k then
6: return j + 1
7: end if
8: end for
a) Bayesian Update: We remark that an attacker who breaks into the authentication server will be able to observe the
signal sigu and S[i, j]. Supposing that sigu = y and S[i, j] we can perform a Bayesian Update after observing the signal y.
In particular, given any password pw ∈ P with strength i = getStrength(pw) we have
Pr [pw | y] =
Pr[pw]S[i, y]∑
pw′∈P Pr [getSignal (getStrength(pw
′))] · Pr [pw′]
=
Pr[pw]S[i, y]∑
i′∈SL Prpw′∼P[getStrength(pw
′) = i′] · S[i′, y]
(1)
If the attacker knew the original password distribution P then updated posterior distribution is simply Py with Prx∼Py [pw | y] :=
Pr [pw | y]. We extend our notation, let λ(π,B; y) =
∑B
i=1 Pr [pw
π
i | y] where pw
π
i is the ith password in the ordering π.
Intuitively, λ(π,B; y) is the conditional probability of cracking the user’s password pw ∼ P by checking the first B guesses
in the permutation π.
4The index of matrix elements start from 0
C. Delayed Signaling
In some instances, the authentication server might implement the password strength oracle getStrength by training a
(differentially private) Count-Sketch based on the user-selected passwords pwu ∼ P. In this case, the strength estimation
will not be accurate until a larger number N of users have registered. In this case, the authentication server may want to
delay signaling until after the Count-Sketch has been initialized. In this case the authentication server will store the tuple
(u, saltu, sigu = ⊥, hu). Once the Count-Sketch has been trained we can use Algorithm 3 to update the record the next time
the user authenticates successfully.
Algorithm 3 Delayed Signaling in Authentication
Input: u, pw′
Output: SUCCESS/FAIL
1: (u, saltu, sigu, hu)← findRecord(u)
2: h′ ← H(saltu, pw
′)
3: if h′ 6= hu then
4: return FAIL
5: end if
6: if sigu = ⊥ (no prior signal) then
7: stu ← getStrength(pw
′)
8: y =
$
← getSignal(pw′)
9: updateRecord as (u, saltu, sigu = y, hu)
10: end if
11: return SUCCESS
V. ADVERSARY MODEL
We adapt the economic model of [1] to capture the behavior of a rational attacker. We assume that there is a value vu for
each password pwu that the attacker cracks. In this paper, we will assume that the attacker is untargeted and that the value
vu = v for each user u ∈ U . Following Kerckhoffs’s principle, we assume that the password distribution P is known to the
attacker.
a) Value/Cost Estimates: One can derive a range of estimates for v based on black market studies e.g., Symantec reported
that passwords generally sell for $4—$30 [67] and [68] reported that Yahoo! e-mail passwords sold for ≈ $1. Similarly, we
assume that the attacker pays a cost k each time s/he evaluates the hash function H to check a password guess. We remark
that one can estimate k ≈ $1× 10−7 if we use a memory-hard function 5.
A. Adversary Utility: No Signaling
We first discuss how a rational adversary would behave when is no signal is available (traditional hashing). We defer the
discussion of how the adversary would update his strategy after observing a signal y to the next section. In the no-signaling
case, the attacker’s strategy (π,B) is given by an ordering π over passwords P and a threshold B. Intuitively, this means
that the attacker will check the first B guesses in π and then give up. If the attacker finds the password on guess i then the
attacker’s net utility would be v − ik. Similarly, if the attacker gives up after B incorrect guesses the attacker’s utility would
be −Bk.
We remark that the expected reward for the attacker is given by the simple formula v × λ(π,B), i.e., the probability that
the password is cracked times the value v. Similarly, the expected guessing cost of the attacker is
C(k, π,B) = k
B∑
i=1
(1 − λ(π, i − 1)), (2)
Intuitively, (1− λ(π, i− 1)) denotes the probability that the adversary actually has to check the ith password guess at cost k.
With probability λ(π, i − 1) the attacker will find the password in the first i − 1 guesses and will not have to check the ith
password guess pwπi . Note that we define λ(π, 0) = 0.
The adversarys expected utility is the difference of expected gain and expected cost,
Uadv (v, k, π,B) = v · λ(π,B)− C(k, π,B). (3)
Sometimes we omit parameters and just write Uadv for short when the v, k and B are clear from context.
5The energy cost of transferring 1GB of memory between RAM and cache is approximately 0.3J on an [69], which translates to an energy cost of
≈ $3 × 10−8 per evaluation. Similarly, if we assume that our MHF can be evaluated in 1 second [35], [70] then evaluating the hash function 6.3 × 107
times will tie up a 1GB RAM chip for 2 years. If it costs $5 to rent a 1GB RAM chip for 2 years (equivalently purchase the RAM chip which lasts for 2
years for $5) then the capital cost is ≈ $8× 10−8 . Thus, our total cost would be around $10−7 per password guess.
B. Optimal Attacker Strategy: No Signaling
A rational adversary would choose (π∗, B∗) ∈ argmaxUadv (v, k, π,B). It is easy to verify that the optimal ordering π
∗ is
always to check passwords in descending order of probability. The probability that a random users account is cracked is
Padv = λ(π
∗, B∗). (4)
We remark that in practice argmaxUadv (v, k, π,B) usually returns a singleton set (π
∗, B∗). If instead the set contains multiple
strategies then we break ties adversarially i.e., Padv = max(π∗,B∗)∈argmaxUadv(v,k,π,B) λ(π
∗, B∗).
VI. INFORMATION SIGNALING AS A STACKELBERG GAME
We model the interaction between the authentication server and the adversary as a two-stage Stackelberg game between the
defender (leader) and attacker (follower). In a Stackelberg game, the leader moves first and then the follower may select its
action after observing the action of the first player.
In our setting the action of the defender is to commit to a signaling matrix S as well as the mapping getStrength between
passwords and strength levels. The attacker responds by selecting a cracking strategy (~π, ~B) = {(π0, B0), . . . , (πd−1, Bd−1)}.
Intuitively, this strategy means that whenever the attacker observes a signal y s/he will check the top By guesses according to
the ordering πy .
A. Attacker Utility
If the attacker checks the top By guesses according to the order πy then the attacker will crack the password with probability
λ(πy , By; y). Recall that λ(πy , By; y) denotes the probability of the first By passwords in πy according to the posterior
distribution Py obtained by applying Bayes Law after observing a signal y. Extrapolating from no signal case, the expected
utility of adversary conditioned on observing the signal y is
Uadv(v, k, πy , By;S, y) =
v · λ(πy , By; y)−
By∑
i=1
k · (1− λ(πy , i− 1; y)) ,
(5)
where By and πy are now both functions of the signal y. Intuitively, (1− λ(πy , i− 1; y)) denotes the probability that the
attacker has to pay cost k to make the ith guess. We use Usadv
(
v, k, {S, (~π, ~B)}
)
to denote the expected utility of the
adversary with information signaling,
Usadv
(
v, k, {S, (~π, ~B)}
)
=∑
y∈SL
Pr[Sig = y]Uadv(v, k, πy, By;S, y) ,
(6)
where
Pr[Sig = y] =
∑
i∈SL
Pr
pw∼P
[getStrength(pw) = i] · S[i, y] .
B. Optimal Attacker Strategy
Now we discuss how to find the optimal strategy (~π∗, ~B∗). It suffices to find (π∗y , B
∗
y) ∈ argmaxBy,πy Uadv(v, k, πy, By; y)
for each signal y. We first remark that the adversary can obtain the optimal checking sequence π∗y for pwu associated with
signal y by sorting all pw ∈ P in descending order of posterior probability according to the posterior distribution Py . Intuitively,
the attacker’s best strategy is to guess passwords in descending order of likelihood.
Now the adversary can determine the optimal budget B∗y for signal y such that B
∗
y = argmaxBy Uadv(v, k, π
∗
y , By; y). In
the appendix we show how to find B∗y more efficiently when given a compact representation of password dataset.
We observe that an adversary who sets πy = π and By = B for all y ∈ SL is effectively ignoring the signal and is equivalent
to an adversary in the no signal case. Thus we have
max
~π, ~B
Usadv
(
v, k, {S, (~π, ~B)}
)
≥ max
π,B
Uadv(v, k, π,B), ∀S, (7)
implying that adversary’s expected utility will never decrease by adapting its strategy according to the signal.
C. Optimal Signaling Strategy
Once the function getStrength() is fixed we want to find the optimal signaling matrix S. We begin by introducing the
defender’s utility function. Intuitively, the defender wants to minimize the total number of cracked passwords.
Let P sadv (v, k,S) denote the expected adversary success rate with information signaling when playing with his/her optimal
strategy, then
P sadv (v, k,S) =
∑
y∈SL
Pr[Sig = y]λ(π∗y , B
∗
y ;S, y), (8)
where (π∗y , B
∗
y) is the optimal strategy of the adversary when receiving signal y, namely,
(π∗y , B
∗
y) = arg max
πy,By
Uadv(v, k, πy, By;S, y).
If argmaxπy,By Uadv(v, k, πy, By; y) returns a set, we break ties adversarially.
The objective of the server is to minimize P sadv (v, k,S), therefore we define
Usser
(
v, k, {S, (~π∗, ~B∗)}
)
= −P sadv (v, k,S) . (9)
Our focus of this paper is to find the optimal signaling strategy, namely, the signaling matrix S∗ such that S∗ = argminS P
s
adv (v, k,S).
Its not hard to see that finding the optimal signaling matrix S∗ is equivalent to solving the mixed strategy Subgame Perfect
Equilibrium (SPE) of the Stackelberg game. At SPE no player has the incentive to derivate from his/her strategy. Therefore,

Usser
(
v, k, {S∗, (~π∗, ~B∗)}
)
≥
Usser
(
v, k, {S, (~π∗, ~B∗)}
)
, ∀S ∈ Sd×d,
Usadv
(
v, k, {S∗, (~π∗, ~B∗)}
)
≥
Usadv
(
v, k, {S∗, (~π, ~B)}
)
, ∀(~π, ~B).
(10)
Notice that a signaling matrix of dimension d can be fully specified by d(d − 1) variables since the elements in each row
sum up to 1. Fixing v and k, we define f : Rd(d−1) → R to be the map from S to P sadv (v, k,S). Then we can formulate the
optimization problem as
min
S
f(s0,0, . . . s0,(d−2), . . . , s(d−1),0, s(d−1),(d−2))
s.t. 0 ≤ si,j ≤ 1, ∀0 ≤ i ≤ d− 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ d− 2,
d−2∑
j=0
si,j ≤ 1, ∀0 ≤ i ≤ d− 1.
(11)
The feasible region is a d(d−1)-dimensional probability simplex. (Notice that in 2-D, the second constraint would be equivalent
to the first constraint.) In our experiments we will treat f as a black box and use derivative-free optimization methods to find
good signaling matrices S.
VII. THEORETICAL EXAMPLE
Having presented our Stackelberg Game model for information signaling we now present an (admittedly contrived) example
of a password distribution where information signaling can dramatically reduce the percentage of cracked passwords. We
assume that the attacker has value v = 2k + ǫ for each cracked password where the cost of each password guess is k and
ǫ > 0 is a small constant.
a) Password Distribution: Suppose that P = {pwi}i≥1 and that each password pwi has probability 2
−i i.e., Pr
pw∼P
[pw = i] =
2−i. The weakest password pw1 would be selected with probability 1/2.
b) Optimal Attacker Strategy: No Signaling: By checking passwords in descending order of probability (the checking
sequence is π) the adversary has an expected cost of:
C(k, π,B) = k
B∑
i=1
i× 2−i + 2−B ×B × k = k(2− 21−B),
and an expected reward of
R(v, k, π,B) = v
B∑
i=1
i2−i,
which leads to expected profits of
Uadv(v, k, π,B) = R(v, k,B)−C(k, π,B) = (v − 2k) + (2k − v)2
−B
.
A profit-motivated adversary is interested in calculating B∗ = argmax
B
Uadv(v, k, π,B). With our sample distribution we have
B∗ =
{
0, v <= 2k,
∞, v > 2k.
Since we assume that v = 2k + ǫ > 2k the attackers optimal strategy is B∗ =∞ meaning that 100% of passwords will be
cracked.
c) Signaling Strategy: Suppose that getStrength is define such that getStrength(pw1) = 0 and getStrength(pwi) = 1
for each i > 1. Intuively, a the strength level is 0 if and only if we sampled the weakest password from the distribution. Now
suppose that we select our signaling matrix
S =
[
1/2 1/2
0 1
]
,
such that Pr[Sig = 0 | pw = pw1] =
1
2 = Pr[Sig = 1 | pw = pw1] and Pr[Sig = 1 | pw 6= pw1] = 1.
d) Optimal Attacker Strategy with Information Signaling: We now analyze the behavior of a rational attacker under
signaling when given this signal matrix and password distribution. Consider the strategy of an attacker who has v = 2k + ǫ.
As noted above their optimal guessing number B∗ with no signal is B∗ =∞.
We now consider the case that the attacker facing Sig = 1. Note that Pr[Sig = 1] = Pr[pw = pw1] Pr[Sig = 1 | pw =
pw1] + Pr[pw 6= pw1] Pr[Sig = 1 | pw 6= pw1] =
3
4 .
We have the following posterior probabilities for each of the passwords in the distribution:
Pr[pw = pw1 | Sig = 1] =
0.5 ∗ 0.5
0.75
=
1
3
,
Pr[pw = pwi, i > 1 | Sig = 1] =
1 ∗ 2−i
0.75
=
4 ∗ 2−i
3
.
Now we compute the attacker’s expected costs conditioned on Sig = 1.
C(k, π,B;S, 1) = k
(
1
3
+
4
3
B∑
i=2
i ∗ 2−i
)
+ kB
(
1−
1
3
−
4
3
(
B∑
i=2
2−i
))
= k
(
7
3
−
23−B
3
)
,
when B > 0, with C(k, π, 0;S, 1) = 0. For expected reward we have:
R(v, k, π,B;S, 1) = v
(
1
3
+
4
3
B∑
i=2
2−i
)
= v
(
1−
22−B
3
)
,
where R(v, k, 0;S, 1) = 0 in the case where no guesses are made. Thus, the attacker’s profit is given by:
Uadv(v, k, π,B;S, 1) = R(v, k, π,B;S, 1)− C(k, π,B;S, 1) = v
(
1−
22−B
3
)
− k
(
7
3
−
23−B
3
)
.
Plugging in v = 2k + ǫ we have
Uadv(2k + ǫ, k, π,B;S, 1) = (2k + ǫ)
(
1−
22−B
3
)
− k
(
7
3
−
23−B
3
)
= (2k + ǫ)
(
1−
22−B
3
)
− k
(
7
3
−
23−B
3
)
= −
1
3
k + ǫ
(
1−
22−B
3
)
,
if ǫ < 13k then this value will always be negative and the optimal strategy is to select B
∗ = 0 i.e. to not run the attack6
If the attacker observes the signal Sig = 0 we know for sure that the user selected the most common password as
Pr[pw = pw1 | Sig = 0] = 1 so as long as v ≥ k the attacker will crack the password.
e) Discussion: In our example an attacker with value v = 2k + ǫ cracks 100% of passwords when we don’t use
information signaling. However, if we deploy our information signaling mechanism (above) and the attacker will only crack
25% of passwords — a reduction of 75%! Given this (contrived) example it is natural to ask whether or not information
signaling produces similar results for more realistic password distributions. We explore this question in the next sections.
6If we set v = 4k instead we would have Uadv(4k, k, pi,B;S, 1) = k
(
5
3
− 2
3−B
3
)
which is maximized at B∗ =∞.
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
A. Password Distribution
We evaluate the performance of our information signaling mechanism empirically using three large password datasets three
large datasets: RockYou, Yahoo!, and LinkedIn. The RockYou password dataset is based on leaked passwords from N ≈ 32.6
million RockYou users, while the Yahoo! frequency corpus (N ≈ 7 × 107) was collected and released with permission from
Yahoo! using differential privacy [4] and other privacy-preserving measures [3]. The LinkedIn frequency corpus (N ≥ 1.7×108)
is a differentially private frequency corpus generated from cracked LinkedIn passwords. We remark that we can simply assign
unique strings to each password in the frequency corpus to obtain a password dataset D with the same empirical
Given a password dataset D (e.g., RockYou) we can define the empirical distribution PD. In our experiments, we will
pretend that P = PD is the real distribution.
a) Implementing getStrength: Given a frequency oracle Of (·) which maps passwords to an (estimated) frequency value
along with thresholds t0 ≥ t1 ≥ t2 . . . ≥ td−1 we can define getStrength(pw) = i if and only if ti−1 ≥ Of (pwd) > ti — see
Algorithm 5 of Appendix D for a more formal description. We select thresholds t0, . . . , td−1 to balance the probability mass
of passwords assigned to each strength level. In some instances this won’t be feasible e.g., when we have over N/d distinct
passwords pw with Of (pw) = 1. In this case we set td−1 = 1 and select t1, . . . , td−2 to balance the remaining strength levels.
We refer an interested reader to Appendix C for more details on how we pick the thresholds t0 ≥ t1 ≥ t2 . . . ≥ td−1.
When the authentication server has perfect knowledge of the distribution we will assume that Of (pwi) = fi, otherwise we
will approximate Of (pwi) using a differentially private count-sketch.
b) Simulating an Authentication Server with Imperfect Knowledge of the Distributions: We can then simulate an authen-
tication server that does not know the distribution exactly by extracting a dataset Ddp from a differentially private count-sketch
trained on the database D. In this case, the authentication server will optimize its signaling matrix S with respect to the
corresponding empirical distribution PDdp while we will evaluate the performance of the signaling scheme with respect to the
actual distribution P = PD.
B. Derivative-Free Optimization
Given a value v and hash cost parameter k we want to find a signaling matrix which optimizes the defenders utility. Recall
that this is equivalent to minimizing the function f(S) = P sadv (v, k,S) subject to the constraints that S is a valid signaling
probability matrix. In our experiments we will treat f as a black box and use derivative-free optimization methods to find good
signaling matrices S.
Derivative-free optimization is active research area with many mature solvers with simple interface, e.g., CMA-ES [71],
NOMAD [72], [73], DAKOTA [74]. In our experiment, we choose BITmask Evolution OPTimization (BITEOPT) algorithm
[75] to compute the quasi-optimal signaling matrix S7. BITEOPT is a free open-source stochastic non-linear bound-constrained
derivative-free optimization method (heuristic or strategy). BiteOpt took 2nd place (1st by sum of ranks) in BBComp2018-
1OBJ-expensive competition track [76].
In each experiment we use BITEOPT with 5000 iterations to generate signaling matrix S. We refer to the procedure
as S ← genSigMat(v, k, d,D) for different v/k ratios. Then we run a second procedure evaluate(v, k, d,S, D) to obtain
the adversary’s expected success rate P sadv given the signaling matrix S and plot figures of P
s
adv against v/k. When we
simulate an authentication server who does not have perfect knowledge of the password distribution we instead call S ←
genSigMat(v, k, d,Ddp) where the password dataset D is replaced with the differentially private version Ddp. However, we
still run evaluate(v, k, d,S, D) as before to obtain the attacker’s expected success rate since the attacker is still assumed to
have perfect knowledge of the password distribution.
C. Differentially Private Count-Sketch
We simulate a server that computes the signaling matrix after collecting all users’ passwords. As users register their accounts,
the server can feed passwords into a count sketch initialized with Laplace noise to ensure differential privacy. We fix the width
(resp. depth) of our count-sketch to be ws = 10
8 (resp. ds = 10) and add Laplace Noise with scaling factor b = ds/ǫpri = 5
to preserve ǫpri = 2-differential privacy. Since we were not optimizing for space we set the number of columns ws to be large
to minimize the probability of hash collisions and increase the accuracy of frequency estimation. Each cell is encoded by an
8-byte double type (because of Laplace noise) so the total size of the sketch is 8 GB.
7BITEOPT maintains a population list of previously evaluated solutions that are ordered in cost (objective function value). The whole population evolves
towards a lower cost. On every iteration, the solution with the highest cost in the list can be replaced with a new solution, and the list is reordered. The
solution vectors are spanned apart from each other to cover a larger parameter search space collectively. Besides that, a range of parameter randomization and
the ”step in the right direction” (Differential Evolution ”mutation”) operations are used that probabilistically make the population evolve to be “fittest ones
(lower cost solutions). BITEOPTs hyper-parameters (probabilities) were pre-selected and are not supposed to be changed. We give a more detailed introduction
of BITEOPT in the appendix.
The populated sketch can also be used to recover a noisy version Ddp of the password dataset D. In particular, Ddp is
obtained by assigning a unique string pwi (password) to each column i ≤ ws and then setting the frequency of pwi to be
minj≤ds T [i, j].
IX. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
We now perform several experiments to evaluate the performance of our information signaling mechanism empirically. In
the first set of experiments, we evaluate the performance of information signaling under the idealistic assumption that the
authentication server has perfect knowledge of the password distribution. In the second set of experiments, we evaluate the
performance under the assumption that the signaling matrix optimized with respect to a different distribution PDdp i.e., based
on dataset Ddp extracted from a differentially private sketch of the user passwords. In the final set of experiments, we evaluate
the performance against online attacks i.e., v/k ≤ 105. Each experiment is repeated for three large password datasets D:
RockYou, Yahoo, and LinkedIn.
Recall that in our analysis we assume that the empirical distribution PD is the real distribution. In reality if D consists
of N iid samples from P then for unique passwords pw ∈ D we cannot assume that our empirical estimate is accurate i.e.,
1
N
6≈ Prx∼P[x = pw]. We use dotted lines in our plots to highlight regions where we cannot be confident that we would get
similar answers if we evaluated with respect to the real distribution P.
A. Signaling with Perfect Knowledge
In this setting, we make the assumption that the authentication server knows the password distribution beforehand. The
signaling matrix is trained and tested on the empirical datasetD (RockYou, Yahoo! or LinkedIn). Specifically, we call procedures
S = genSigMat(v, k, d,D) and P sadv = evaluate(v, k, d,S, D) sequentially.
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Fig. 1. Signaling with Perfect Knowledge
Take the RockYou dataset as our analytical example. We first look at how the signaling matrix affects the adversary’s
expected success rate in cracking a random password (Fig. 1a ). Ignoring v/k values where the red line is dotted (indicating
uncertaintly8) we find that the adversary success rate is reduced by up to 10% for the RockYou dataset (11% for Yahoo and
13% for LinkedIn).
The size of the matrices also plays an important role. Generally, matrices of larger size (S ∈ R7×7) yield lower adversary
success rates than matrices of small size (S ∈ R2×2 and S ∈ R3×3) when v/k < 2 · 107. Above that ratio the advantage is not
obvious, sometimes 3 by 3 matrices even outperform 7 by 7 matrices. This might because the experiment iteration number of
BITEOPT is not large enough for the optimization problem of 42 variables (7 by 7 matrices) but is good enough for that of 6
variables (3 by 3 matrices). Another reason might be the advantage of fine granularity of signals diminishes as more passwords
are cracked.
Which accounts are cracked? As Fig. 1a demonstrates information signaling can substantially reduce the overall fraction
of cracked passwords i.e., many previously cracked passwords are now protected. It is natural to ask whether there are any
unlucky users u whose password is cracked after information signaling even though their account was safe before signaling.
Let Xu (resp. Lu) denote the event that user u is unlucky (resp. lucky) i.e., a rational attacker would originally not crack
pwu, but after information signaling the account is cracked. We measured E[Xu] (See Figure 2) and E[Lu] for various v/k
values under each dataset. Generally, we find that the fraction of unlucky users E[Xu] is small in most cases e.g. ≤ 0.01
although we found one instance where E[Lu] ≈ 0.08. For example, when v/k = 10
7 we measured that E[Xu] ≈ 0.0066 and
E[Lu] ≈ 0.048 (LinkedIn). In all instances the net advantage E[Lu]− E[Xu] remains positive.
8The predictions might be quite different if we were able to evaluate on the real (unknown) distribution P.
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Fig. 2. Proportion of unlucky users for various datasets (E [Xu])
B. Signaling with Imperfect Knowledge
Contrasted with perfect knowledge, in this setting the server does not know password distribution at the time of user
registration and has to collect all password data before generating signals. As a simulation of imperfect knowledge, this
experiment consists of following steps:
1) populate the count sketch with Du. At the initialization stage of the count sketch, Laplace noise is added to ensure
differential privacy.
2) extract the minimum of each column of the sketch to obtain a frequency list with differential privacy Ddp.
3) train the signaling matrix on Ddp, namely, S = genSigMat(v, k, d,Ddp) (the strength oracle is also obtained from the
differentially private sketch).
4) test the signaling matrix S obtained from step 4 on the real datasetD, namely, call procedure P sadv = evaluate(v, k, d,S, D).
We used a sketch of size 108 × 10 (ws = ⌈2/ǫerr⌉, ds = ⌈−1 ∗ ln(1 − δ)/ ln 2⌉ with error parameters ǫerr = 0.00000002
and δ = 0.999). Our signaling matrix dimension is fixed as d = 7. Results are shown in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. Signaling with Imperfect Knowledge
From Fig. 3a, we observe that the imperfect knowledge curve coincides with perfect knowledge before 2× 106 and begins
to diverge afterward. This is because the adversary is targeting high-frequency passwords when v/k < 2 × 106, the noised
version of frequency list Ddp has relatively accurate estimations for those frequencies, so signaling with imperfect knowledge
performs as good as signaling with perfect knowledge. As v/k increases, passwords with low frequency (passwords occur
twice or once) begin to be cracked and sketch cells populated with low frequencies are sensitive to hash collisions and Laplace
noises, resulting in inaccurate estimations for low frequencies, thus signaling with imperfect knowledge does not perform as
well.
There are some spikes at the end of the curve, sometimes resulting in a lower adversary success rate at a higher v/k point.
The lack of monotonicity occurs because BITEOPT is a heuristic algorithm that does not always find the optimal signaling
matrix. We verified that monotonicity is recovered if the same signaling matrix were to be used at each of the turbulent points.
a) Robustness: We also evaluated the robustness of the signaling matrix when the defender’s estimate of the ratio v/k
is inaccurate. In particular, we generated the signaling matrix S(106) (resp. S(107)) which was optimized with respect to the
ratio v/k = 106 (resp. 107) and evaluated the performance of both signaling matrices against an attacker with different v/k
ratios. We find that password signaling is tolerant even if our estimate of v/k is off by a small multiplicative constant factor
e.g., 2. For example, in Fig. 3b the signaling matrix S(107) outperforms the no-signaling case even when the real v/k ratio
is as large as 2× 107. In the “downhill” direction, even if the estimation of v/k deviates from its true value up to 5× 106 at
anchor point 107 it is still advantageous for the server to deploy password signaling.
C. Password Signaling against Online Attacks
We can extend the experiment from password signaling with imperfect knowledge to an online attack scenario. One common
way to throttle online attackers is to require the attacker to solve a CAPTCHA challenge [77] (or provide some other proof
of work) after each incorrect login attempt [78]. One advantage of this approach is that a malicious attacker cannot lockout
an honest user by repeatedly submitting incorrect passwords [79]. However, the solution also allows an attacker to continue
trying to crack the password as long as s/he is willing to continue paying the cost to solve the CAPTCHA/PoW challenges.
When modeling a rational online password we will assume that v/k ≤ 105 as the cost to pay a human to solve a CAPTCHA
challenge (e.g., $10−3) is typically much larger than the cost to evaluate a memory-hard cryptographic hash function (e.g.,
$10−8).
a) Implementing Password Signaling: One naive way to implement password signaling in an online would simply be
to send back the signal noisy signal sigu along with any incorrect login attempt. We would propose a solution where users
with stronger signal sigu are shown more leniency initially e.g., the server might reasonably allow 10 incorrect login attempts
before throttling if the password is signaled as strong while they might allow just 3 attempts before throttling if the password
is weak. This might provide motivation for users to pick stronger passwords. The attacker can indirectly infer the signal sigu
by measuring this delay.
Since we consider v/k ≤ 105 we modify the strength levels for our getStrength oracle accordingly i.e., to distinguish
between passwords among the top 104 (green curve) or top 103 (blue curve) in our dataset D. As before we fix the signaling
matrix dimension to be d = 7. The results are shown is shown in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4. Password Signaling against Online Attacks
Our empirical analysis demonstrates that information signaling can be an effective defense against even online attackers. In
Fig. 4a, when v/k = 7000, the comparative difference is 31% i.e., we can rescue 31% of user’s whose passwords would have
been cracked. Similar observations hold true for the other two datasets, Yahoo and LinkedIn, except for the concrete values.
We observe that the blue curve performs better than the green curve when v/k is small (e.g., v/k < 2 × 104 in Fig. 4a)
and that the green curve performs better when v/k is larger. This is because we want to have a fine-grained partition for the
weaker (top 103) passwords that the adversary might target when v/k is small.
D. Discussion
While our experimental results are positive, we stress that there are several questions that would need to be addressed before
we recommend deploying information signaling to protect against offline attacks.
• Can we accurately predict the ratio v/k? Our results suggest that information signaling is useful even when our estimates
deviate by a factor of 2. However, if our estimates are wildly off then information signaling could be harmful.
• How would users react to information signaling? In information signaling, some users with weaker passwords will get
lucky and draw a signal that protects them against offline attacks while other users will not be so lucky.
• Can we analyze the behavior of rational targetted attackers? We only consider an untargeted adversary who has a constant
password value expectation for all accounts. In some settings, an attacker might place a higher value on some passwords
e.g., celebrity accounts. Can we predict how a targetted attacker would behave if the value vu varied from user to user?
Similarly, a targetted adversary could exploit demographic and/or biographical knowledge to improve password guessing
attacks e.g., see [80].
• What happens when v/k is large? As v/k grows large we become increasingly less confident in how our information
signaling would perform relative to the real (unknown) password distribution P. The empirical distribution PD provides
a good approximating when v/k is small, but when v/k ≥ 108 we cannot make any confident predictions.
X. CONCLUSIONS
We introduced information signaling as a novel, yet counter-intuitive, defense against rational password attackers. We
introduced a Stackelberg game model to capture the interaction between the authentication server and presented an algorithm
for the authentication server to optimize its signaling matrix. We ran empirical experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of
password signaling on three datasets: RockYou, Yahoo, and LinkedIn, results show that up to 13% of LinkedIn passwords
(in the confident zone) that would have been cracked can be saved by deploying password signaling. We view our positive
experimental results as a proof of concept which motivates futher exploration of password signaling.
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APPENDIX A
BITEOPT ALGORITHM
One iteration of BITEOPT is in essence a state automate which includes 7 stages (see Fig. 5 where q1, . . . , q4 are state
transformation probability):
• Initialization stage: randomly generate a list of solutions x (population size is sizep) ordered in cost, chose one of 4 best
solutions to be evolved, xnew = xbest.
• Stage 1: perform the “step in the right direction operation using the random previous solution, chosen best and worst
solutions, plus a difference of two other random solutions. This is conceptually similar to Differential Evolution’s “mutation
operation. The used worst solution is randomly chosen from 3 worst solutions.
xnew = xbest −
(xworst − xrand − (xrand2 − xrand3))
2
.
• Intermediate stage.
• Stage 2: perform “bitmask inversion operation for a single (or multiple) parameter value(s). Below, i is either equal
to rand(1, d(d − 1)) or in the range [1 : d(d − 1)], depending on a hyper-parameter AllpProb. ≫ is a bit shift-right
operation, MantSize is a constant equal to 54, MantSizeSh is a hyper-parameter that limits bit shift operation range.
Actual implementation is more complex as it uses average of two such operations.
mask = (2MantSize − 1)≫ ⌊rand(0 . . . 1)4 ·MantSizeSh⌋,
xnew[i] =
⌊xnew[i] · 2
MantSize⌋ ⊗mask
2MantSize
.
• Stage 3: perform the “random move around operation. This operation is performed twice.
xnew [i] = xnew [i]− rand(−1 . . . 1) · q3 · (xnew [i])− xrand[i].
• Stage 4: An alternative randomization method is used involving the best solution, centroid vector and a random solution.
xnew [i] = xnew[i] + (−1)
j
(xcent[i]− xnew[i]),
i = 1, . . . , d(d− 1), s ∈ 1, 2 = (rand(0 . . . 1) < 0.5?1 : 2)
• Stage 5: perform “short-cut parameter vector change operation.
z = xnew [rand(1 . . . d(d− 1))],
xnew[i] = z, ∀i = 1, . . . , d(d− 1).
• Decision stage: If the cost xnew is less than the worst cost of current population, then xnew is accepted; otherwise, it will
be rejected.
Initstart
Inter
1
2 3
4 5 Deci
q1
q4
q2
q3
q4
q4
q4
Fig. 5. State automate of one iteration of BITEOPT
APPENDIX B
COMPUTATION SIMPLIFICATION USING EQUIVALENCE CLASS LIST
Often the number of unique passwords is much larger than the number of equivalence classes. We would like to tailor our
algorithm to equivalence class instead of individual passwords to improve efficiency. The following theorem states that the
adversary can check the entire equivalence classes at once, thus reduce the computation time.
Theorem 1. Let (π∗, B∗) be the optimal strategy of adversary and given two passwords pwi and pwj in the same equivalence
class. Then
Indπ∗(pwi) ≤ B
∗ ⇔ Indπ∗(pwj) ≤ B
∗, (12)
where Indπ∗(pwi) denotes the index of pwi in optimal checking sequence π
∗.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that the optimal strategy checks pwi but not pwj . Then WLOG we can assume that Invπ∗(i) =
B∗ is the last password to be checked and that Invπ∗(j) = B
∗+1 is the next password to be checked (otherwise, we can swap
pwj with the password in the equivalence class that will be checked next). Since pwi and pwj are in the same equivalence
class, we have Pr[pwdi] = Pr[pwdj ]. The marginal utility of checking pwdi is
∆i = vPr[pwi]− k(1− λ(π
∗, B∗)).
Because checking pwi is part of the optimal strategy, it must be the case ∆i ≥ 0. Otherwise, we would immediately derive
a contradiction since the strategy (π∗, B∗ − 1) would have greater utility than (π∗, B∗). Now the marginal utility ∆j =
UADV (v, k, (π
∗, B∗ + 1))− UADV (v, k, (π
∗, B∗)) of checking pwj as well is
∆j = vPr[pwj ]− k(pwj)(1 − λ(π
∗, B∗)− Pr[pwj ]) > ∆i ≥ 0 .
Since ∆j > 0 we have UADV (v, k, (π
∗, B∗ + 1)) > UADV (v, k, (π
∗, B∗)) contradicting the optimality of (π∗, B∗).
This theorem implies that passwords in the same equivalence class are essentially identical from the perspective of the
adversary. If the optimal strategy indicates to check a password in an equivalence class, then checking all the passwords in
that equivalence class is also optimal. Immediately follows Corollary 2.
Corollary 1. The optimal passwords checking number B∗ lies in the list S = {0, c1, c1 + c2, · · · ,
∑n′
i=1 ci}.
When cracking uses accounts the adversary increases the number of guesses B by the size of the next equivalence class (if
there is net profit by doing so). In short, the adversary checks passwords class by class instead of one by one.
Corollary 2. Let (π∗y , B
∗
y) be the optimal strategy of adversary for signal y and given two passwords pwi and pwj in the
same equivalence class. Then
Indπ∗y (pwi) ≤ B
∗
y ⇔ Indπ∗y (pwj) ≤ B
∗
y , (13)
Because Pr[pwi] = Pr[pwj ], then Pr [pwi | Sig = y] = Pr [pwj | Sig = y]. The next follows proof of Theorem 1. The
corollary states that the adversary still should not differentiate passwords in an equivalence class in the presence of signals.
Thus, we can apply the simplification technique of Corollary 2.
APPENDIX C
LABELING PASSWORDS STRENGTH
Based on how score is defined password strength can be classified into the following catorgrioies.
1) composition strength: For many years, score(pw) was a function of LUDS: counts of lower-and uppercase letters, digits
and symbols. As a descendent of LUDS, NIST entropy, recommended by the agency in 2013 [81], remains an influential
metric for password strength.
2) pattern strength: zxcvbn [82] combines common token lookup and pattern matching to heuristically estimate a guessing
attack directly, Instead of estimating a virtual guessing attack, Probabilistic Context-Free Grammars (PCFGs) [20]–[22], Markov
Models [23]–[26], Neural Networks [27] build a checking dictionary to crack passwords. We consider strength calculated from
these cracking models a form of pattern strength.
3) frequency strength: Composition strength and pattern strength both require plaintext password data to compute, while
frequency strength only requires the frequency of each password in the dataset. This allows for the use of non-plaintext
password databases e.g. of the type provided by [4]. We adopt frequency strength in this work.
Given some password dataset D, |D| = N , and the frequencies for each password fi we can create a partition of the dataset
with roughly equivalent size in descending order of password frequency. In particular, we divide the probability space [0, 1]
evenly, i.e., setting strength thresholds to be 0, 1/d, 2/d, . . . , d/d. Given a frequency list Df and the frequency of a password
fk, if i/d <
∑k
j=1 fj/N ≤ (i+ 1)/d for some i ∈ 0, . . . d− 1, we label password of frequency fk with strength level i.
Now we propose a heuristic algorithm to partition the password dataset as even as possible with respect to probability
mass. Suppose there are d buckets representing d strength levels, we label strength for password equivalence classes backward,
handing the tough nut first. We maintain 4 variables: probMass denoting the probability mass of current password equivalence
class, volume the probability mass that has been “poured” in the current bucket, capacity the presumed ceiling of probability
mass for the current bucket, labeledProb the probability mass of passwords that have been labeled with a strength level.
Initially, capacity of the last bucket is 1/d, volume of the last bucket is the probability of the last equivalence class fn
N
∗ cn, If
fn
N
∗ cn ≥ 1/d which is typically the case, even though this is a violation of the constraint volume ≤ capacity, we still allow
last equivalence class to be put in the last bucket (only for the first violation); If fn
N
∗ cn < 1/d we keep adding equivalence
class until the bucket is full or just beginning to overflow. Then we move to the second to last bucket and capacity is updated
as (1− labeledProb)/(d−1). This process goes on until we have labeled all passwords in the frequency list. After the labeling,
the largest frequencies all for labels are output as the strength thresholds. Details can be found in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Label strength levels for passwords
Input: Equivalence class list Deq = {(f1, c1), . . . , (fn, cn)}, number of strength levels d
Output: Strength thresholds {t0, . . . , td−1}
probMass = 0
volume = 0
labeledProb = 0
for i=n to 1 do
probMass← fi
N
· ci
volume+ = probMass
capacity = (1− labeledProb)/d
if volume > capacity then
// only first violation of the constraint volume ≤ capacity is allowed
set strength level of pwds with frequency fi to be d− 1
labeledProb += volume
volume = 0
d −= 1
else
// no violation
set strength level of pwds with frequency fi to be d− 1
end if
end for
return {t0, . . . , td−1}, where ti is the largest frequency with label i.
APPENDIX D
STRENGTH ORACLE
Based on frequency thresholds and estimated frequency obtained from count sketch, we can construct a strength oracle.
Algorithm 5 Strength oracle getStrength()
Input: Of , pwu, {t0, . . . , td−1}
Output: strength level of pwu
1: f˜(pwu)← Of (pwu)
2: for i = d− 1 to 0 do
3: if f˜(pwu) <= ti then
4: return i
5: else
6: // If the estimated frequency is larger than t0, it will be considered as weak as level 0 pwds
7: return 0
8: end if
9: end for
